Abstract-We propose a distributed feedback control that steers a dynamical network to a prescribed equilibrium corresponding to the so-called Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The network dynamics considered here are a class of passive nonlinear second-order systems, where production and demands act as external inputs to the systems. While productions are assumed to be controllable at each node, the demand is determined as a function of local prices according to the utility of the consumers. Using reduced information on the demand, the proposed controller guarantees the convergence of the closed loop system to the optimal equilibrium point dictated by the Cournot-Nash competition.
I. INTRODUCTION In recent years there has been a renewed interest in controllers that can steer a given dynamical system to an optimal steady state, mostly motivated by research connected to power networks, where, for instance, given a certain demand, the problem of dynamically adjusting the generation in order to satisfy the demand while fulfilling an optimal criterion at steady state, e.g., minimizing the generation costs or maximizing the social welfare, has been formulated and addressed with different approaches. Other application domains of interests are flow and heat networks, data centers as well as logistic systems.
Loosely speaking, the proposed approaches to dynamically control networks while fulfilling steady-state optimality criteria can be classified in two categories. One relies on primal-dual gradient algorithms, which solve the optimization problem, and apply on-line the computed control input to the physical network, possibly taking into account feedback signals coming from the network for improved robustness [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] . This approach returns control algorithms that can handle general convex objective functions and constraints but typically requires either a good knowledge of the demand, or a number of measurements of network variables, sometimes more than what is really available in practice.
A second category relies on internal-model based controllers [5] , [6] , [7] , popularized under the acronym DAPI (distributed averaging proportional integral controllers) [8] , which can typically deal with linear-quadratic cost functions only, but can on the other hand tackle uncertainty in the power demand.
This paper aims at contributing to the second category of results allowing for some degree of uncertainty in the demand and considering an economic objective which is different from the ones considered so far -economic optimal dispatch, implemented via a distributed [5] , [6] or a semi-decentralized Claudio De Persis and Nima Monshizadeh are with the Engineering and Technology Institute, University of Groningen, The Netherlands, c.de.persis@rug.nl, n.monshizadeh@rug.nl control architecture [9] . In fact, our interest is to design controllers at the producers that aim at maximizing their profit according to a Cournot model of competition [10] .
Other works are available that have solved problems different from the economic optimal dispatch problem, e.g., [11] , [12] , where algorithms solving the optimal power generation model under a Bertrand model of competition and a primaldual setting have been proposed.
Cournot models of competition, and the resulting CournotNash equilibrium [13] , [14] , [15] are very well studied topics in game theory. Pseudo-gradient dynamical algorithms that converge to Cournot-Nash equilibria have been extensively investigated in the literature [16] , [17] , [18] .
What differentiates our results from the existing one are two features. First, as highlighted before, we devise a feedback control algorithm that does not rely on the exact knowledge of the demand in the network. Second, this algorithm is interconnected in a feedback loop with a given physical network, and the resulting closed-loop system is analyzed as a whole, showing that the physical network converge to an equilibrium at which the controller output equals the value of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Since the controller state variable has the interpretation of a price, we at times refer to the feedback control also as a pricing mechanism.
Although the motivation for this investigation was inspired by problems in power networks, in order to convey the results to an audience that is not necessarily interested to power networks, we decided to present our results for a class of nonlinear second-order passive dynamical networks [19] , in which power networks fall after suitable modifications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we recall basic concepts and results about the Cournot model of competition. Section III contains the main results of the paper, namely the design and analysis of a distributed feedback controller steering the closed-loop system towards a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. A numerical case study is discussed in Section IV. Conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. COURNOT COMPETITION
In this section, we revisit a few results about the Cournot model of competition ( [13] , [10] ), which are used to determine the optimal triple of supply, demand and price. This characterization is instrumental to formulate our main results in the next section, where a dynamic controller is designed to steer a given network to such optimal Cournot triple.
In a model of Cournot competition, n producers produce a homogeneous good that is demanded by m consumers. The arXiv:1803.03593v1 [math.OC] 9 Mar 2018 price p of the good is assumed to be determined by the good productions, while the consumers are price takers, a scenario motivated by having few producers and many consumers.
Each producer i aims at maximizing its profit Π gi : R n ≥0 → R, given the production of other firms. The profit is defined by the objective function Π gi (P gi , P −gi ) = p(P g )P gi −C gi (P gi ), i ∈ I := {1, 2, . . . , n}, where P gi ∈ R ≥0 is the good production by producer i, P g = col(P g1 , . . . , P gn ) ∈ R n is the vector of all the productions, P −gi ∈ R n−1 is the vector obtained by removing the ith element of P g , p : R n → R is the price function, and C gi : R ≥0 → R is a function satisfying the following assumption [13] : Assumption 1. For each i, the cost function C gi is convex, non-decreasing and continuously differentiable for P gi ∈ R ≥0 . Moreover, C gi (0) = 0.
Given a price p ∈ R, each consumer j wants to maximize its utility, described by the function
where P dj ∈ R ≥0 is the good demand by consumer j and U j : R ≥0 → R is a continuously differentiable function. To ease the notation, in the sequel, we denote p simply by p. Now, given a price p ∈ R, we consider the utility maximisation problem sup
Assumption 2. For each j ∈ J the utility function U j : R ≥0 → R is continuously differentiable and strictly concave. Moreover, U j : R ≥0 → R satisfies lim P dj →+∞ U j (P dj ) = −∞ and U j (0) > 0.
A. Utility Maximisation
The utility maximisation problem admits the following solution: Proposition 1. Let Assumption 2 hold. Then, P dj is solution to (1) if and only if
where π j : R → R ≥0 is defined as
Proof. The proof descends from the KKT conditions.
B. Supply-demand matching
As will be discussed in Section III, we are interested in a supply-demand balancing condition, where the total generation is equal to the total demand, namely
where P d = (P d1 , . . . , P dm ) and 1 denotes the vector of all ones of suitable size. Under this balancing condition, the price can be written as a function of the total production, as stated next.
Proposition 2. Let Assumption 2 and the balance equation (4) hold, with 1 P g ≥ 0. Then, there exists a continuous function u : R ≥0 → R satisfying
with the following properties: (i) u(0) > 0; (ii) u is strictly decreasing; (iii) lim q→+∞ u(q) = −∞.
Proof. In view of Assumption 2, the functions π j (λ) in (2) are continuous with range equal to the whole R ≥0 . Each function π j (λ) is strictly decreasing on the interval (−∞, U j (0)] and identically zero on the interval [U j (0), +∞). Define the function π(λ):= j∈J π j (λ). This is a continuous function with range equal to the whole R ≥0 . Moreover it is strictly decreasing on (−∞, max j U j (0)] and identically zero on the interval [max j U j (0), +∞). Let q := π(λ). Then, the function π can be inverted, on the interval where q ∈ R >0 , to obtain λ = π −1 (q). Now, we define u : R ≥0 → R as
where
. By construction, u is a continuous function, which is strictly decreasing and satisfies the properties (i), (ii), (iii) of the statement. Moreover, by substituting q = 1 P g in (6), using (2) together with the balancing condition (4), and noting monotonicity of u, we obtain the equality (5). Example 1. Consider the case of 2 consumers with linearquadratic utility functions
and for q = π(λ), q > 0, we have
It then follows that
In view of (2) and (5), we conclude that the optimal demands are given by
By construction, the optimal demand P d detailed above satis-
C. Profit Maximisation: the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
Motivated by the discussion before, we consider a Cournot game consisting of the set of producers I each one aiming at solving the maximisation problem
with
More formally, we define the Cournot game as follows:
A set I of producers (or players); ii) A strategy P gi ∈ R for each producer i ∈ I;
iii) The convex and closed set R n ≥0 of allowed strategies P g = (P g1 , . . . , P gn ); iv) A payoff function Π gi (P gi , P −gi ), where for P g ∈ R n ≥0 , Π gi (P g ) is continuous in P g and concave in P gi for each fixed P −gi .
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is defined next [13] :
The existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a consequence of a well-know result on concave games due to [20] . Let us recall the definition of a concave game. Definition 3. A concave game consists of i) A set I of players; ii) A strategy x i ∈ R pi for each player i ∈ I; iii) The convex, closed and bounded set R ⊂ R p of allowed
where for x ∈ S, ϕ i (x) is continuous in x and concave in x i for each fixed x −i , with S = P 1 × . . . × P n and P i is the projection of R on R mi .
A difference between a Cournot and a concave game is the lack of a bounded set of bounded strategies for the Cournot game (R n ≥0 is clearly unbounded). However, following [13, Proposition 2] , it can be shown that solving (9) is equivalent to solving max
withP gi some positive constant. As a matter of fact,
and by Assumptions 1, 2 and Proposition 2, there exists P gi > 0 such that Π gi (P gi , P −gi ) = 0 and Π gi (P gi , P −gi ) < 0 for P gi ≥P gi . Hence, in the case of (11),
Moreover, the payoff function Π gi (P gi , P −gi ) satisfies the properties of a concave game by Assumptions 1, 2 and Proposition 2. Therefore the game defined by (11) , or equivalently by (9) , is a concave game. It can then be concluded by [20, Theorem 1] that a Cournot-Nash equilibrium exists.
Theorem 1. [20, Theorem 1]
Under Assumptions 1 and 2 there exists a Cournot-Nash equilibrium P g .
D. Linear-quadratic utility and cost functions
In this subsection and for the remainder of the paper, we restrict the cost and utility functions of producers and consumers to linear-quadratic functions, namely
Proposition 1 is specialized as follows:
Corollary 1. The scalar P dj is a solution to (1) with U j as in (13) if and only if
We are particularly interested in the case where all producers and consumers enter the market, that is P gi , P dj > 0 for all i ∈ I and j ∈ J. Conditions under which this case occurs are formalised next. Lemma 1. Let the utility functions of consumers be given by (13) and consider the utility maximization problem (1). Then, the following statements are equivalent:
3) The vector P d given by
is the unique solution to (1), and p = b d .
Proof. See Appendix.
We note that, given the strictly positive demand (15) in Lemma 1, the expression can be inverted to obtain
and
We turn now our attention to the producers. Let the price function in (9) admit the affine form
for some scalars α, β > 0, which is motivated by Proposition 2 specialized to the case of linear-quadratic cost functions with strictly positive generation and demand. In the next section, the scalars α and β in (18) will be set to those in (17), as we are interested in the supply-demand matching condition (4). This will be made more explicit in Theorem 2.
Since Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied in the case of linearquadratic functions, Theorem 1 holds and a Cournot-Nash equilibrium exists. Then, the computation of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium P g descends from the optimization problem
where, in view of (10), (12), (18),
The conditions under which the parabola (β − αP gi − α1 P −gi )P gi − 1 2 P gi Q gi P gi − b gi P gi has a nonnegative maximizer can be formalized as follows: Proposition 3. P gi is a solution to (19) if and only if
The proof is omitted.
Recall that we are interested in the case where every producer contributes a strictly positive production, i.e. P g ∈ R n >0 . This brings us to the following lemma:
Lemma 2. The following statements are equivalent:
1) There exists P g ∈ R n >0 solution to (19) .
2) The vector P g given by
is the unique solution to (19) and β − α1 P g =b g , where
holds.
Summarizing, Corollary 1 and Proposition 3 identify the optimal production and optimal demand, respectively, for the cost and utility functions (12) and (13) . Lemma 1 characterizes the conditions under which the optimal demand of each consumer is strictly positive, and Lemma 2 provides equivalent conditions for strict positivity of optimal productions. Based on the aforementioned results, the following necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an optimal triple
Theorem 2. Let the price function admit the affine form p(P g ) = β − α1 P g , for some positive scalars α, β > 0. For linear-quadratic functions (12), (13) , let P g denote the Cournot-Nash equilibrium solution to (19) , and P d the optimal demand solution to (1) computed with respect to the optimal price p := p(P g ). Then, the following are equivalent: 1)
Moreover, in case α = α * and β = β * with α * and β * as in (17) , then the balancing condition holds, namely
Proof. By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, establishing the equivalence of the three statements is straightforward. Now suppose that α = α * and β = β * . Then equation (24b) becomes
This yields
The balancing condition (25) then follows from (17).
Remark 1. The vector P g in (24a) can be rewritten as
Hence, the triple (P g , P d , p ) can be equivalently characterized by the implicit form
Remark 2. To give an interpretation to condition (23), we rewrite it in a different form. By Theorem 2, condition (23) can be rewritten as
which is equivalent to b g < β − α1 P g < b d , or also
Noting that p(P g ) is monotonically decreasing, the lower bound yields C i (0) < p(0). This means that the marginal costs of the producers are lower than the price at zero generation (P gi = 0). Therefore, the producers always benefit from providing nonzero amount of goods to the consumers. Analogously, the upper bound indicates that the marginal utility of each consumer at zero demand (P dj = 0) is higher than the the eventual optimal price p = p(P g ) dictated by the consumers. Hence, under condition (23), it is always advantageous for consumers to enter the market and have a strictly positive demand.
III. COURNOT-NASH OPTIMAL DYNAMICAL NETWORKS
In the previous section, we studied Cournot competition and characterized the Cournot-Nash equilibrium among producers and consumers. In this section, we introduce a dynamical network whose output variables are affected by the cumulative effect of demand and generation mismatch. Using these variables as measurements, we devise a dynamic output feedback algorithm that steers the dynamical network to the CournotNash optimal solution identified by the triple (P g , P d , p ) with
Note that the triple above is obtained from (27) by setting α = α * and β = β * . The reason why we are interested in the latter choice is to ensure that the balancing condition (25) is met. Moreover, we require a reduced amount of information about the consumers to allow for the changing demand present in dynamic interactive markets. Finally, note that the feedback algorithm should be designed such that the stability of the physical system is not compromised.
A. Network dynamics
The topology of the network is represented by a connected and undirected graph G(V, E) with a vertex set V = {1, . . . , n}, and an edge set E given by the set of unordered pairs {i, j} of distinct vertices i and j. The cardinality of E is denoted by m 1 . The set of neighbors of node i is denoted by N i = {j ∈ V | {i, j} ∈ E}.
We consider a second-order consensus based network dynamics of the form:
where m i , d i ∈ R >0 are constant, H ij : R → R is a continuously differentiable strictly convex 2 with its minimum at the origin, ∇H ij denotes the partial derivative of H ij with respect to its argument x i −x j , x i ∈ R is the state associated to node i, and u i ∈ R is the input applied to the dynamics of the ith node. Note that as H ij is strictly convex, ∇H ij is a strictly increasing function of x i − x j . The second order dynamics (30) can represent different kind of networks, including power networks, by appropriately choosing the function H i , see e.g. [21] , [22] . Producers and consumers affect the dynamics (30) via
where P gi is the production and P di is the aggregated demand at node i as before. This means that a mismatch between production and demand causes the node i's state variable to drift away from its unforced behavior. Note that the number of producers and consumers here are considered to be the same, and we thus use the notation P di rather than P dj which was used in the previous section. Let R be the incidence matrix of the graph G. Note that, by associating an arbitrary orientation to the edges, the incidence matrix R ∈ R n×m is defined element-wise as R ik = 1, if node i is the sink of edge k, d ik = −1, if i is the source of edge k, and R ik = 0 otherwise. In addition, ker R = im 1 for a connected graph G. Then, (30) can be written in vector form asẋ = y (31a)
In addition, col(∇H ij ) is denoted by ∇H : R m → R m , where the edge ordering in ∇H is the same as that of the incidence matrix R. It is easy to see that (31) has non-isolated equilibria for constant vectors P g and P d . In fact, given a solution (x, y) of (31), (x+c1, y) is a solution to (31) as well, for any constant c ∈ R. To avoid this complication, we perform a change of coordinates by defining
This new set of coordinates can be also written as 
. .
Let R ζ ∈ R n−1 × R m denote the incidence matrix with its n-th row removed. Then, by the equality above we have
where col(ζ i ) = ζ ∈ R n−1 . Moreover, it holds that ζ = E x where E = I n−1 −1 n−1 . Noting that R = ER ζ , and defining a function H ζ such that H(R ζ ζ) = H ζ (ζ), and thus R ζ ∇H(R ζ ζ) = ∇H ζ (ζ), the system (31) in the new coordinates reads aṡ
Remark 3. Note that the system above belongs to the class of dynamical networks given by the feedback interconnection of incrementally output feedback passive dynamics at the nodes of the form [19] 
with h(y) = y, f (y, v, w) = M −1 (−Dy + v + w), w = P g − P d , and incrementally passive dynamics at the edgeṡ
where the interconnection constraints are given by
We have opted to consider the system (33) rather than more general subclasses of (34), (35), to keep the focus of the paper and provide more explicit results.
As a result of the change of coordinates, the network (33) now has at most one equilibrium, for given constant vector P g and P d , and we have the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Let P g = P g and P d = P d for some constant vectors P g , P d ∈ R n . Then the point (ζ, y) is an equilibrium of (33) if and only if
where E + = (E E) −1 E . Moreover, the equilibrium, if exists, is unique.
B. Dynamic pricing mechanism
Next, we seek for a dynamic feedback (pricing mechanism) that steers the physical network to an asymptotically stable equilibrium, while guaranteeing the convergence of the production and the demand to the Cournot-Nash solution. In particular, we are interested to regulate the production P g to P g , the demand P d to P d , and attain the optimal price p given by (29). Note that, statically setting the generation and production as P g = P g and P d = P d is undesirable as it requires complete information of the entire network and utility functions.
Recall that in the Cournot model, consumers are price takers, meaning they optimize their utility functions given a price. Consistent with (29b)-(29c) we consider the demand as
where p i (t) can be interpreted as a momentary or estimated price for the ith consumer at time t. In vector form this is written as
, with p(t) = col(p i (t)). Next, looking at the expression of y * in Lemma 3, we notice that the deviation from the supply-demand matching condition (4) is reflected on the steady-state value of the state variable y. In fact, (4) holds if and only if y * = 0. This motivates the implementation of a negative feedback from y to P g in the controller. Moreover, in order to ensure optimality, we rely on a communication layer next to the physical network that appropriately distribute the information on the local price estimations p i over the entire network. The topology of this communication layer is modeled via an undirected connected graph G c (V, E c ), and the set of neighbors of the node i is denoted by N c i . Inspired by the aforementioned remarks, and motivated by some additional stability and optimality considerations, the following distributed controller (pricing mechanism) is proposed:
where τ i > 0 is the time constant, ρ ij > 0 indicates the weight of the communication at each link, and the constant parameter k i > 0 will be specified later. Let T = diag(τ i ), K = diag(k i ), and the weighted Laplacian matrix of G c be denoted by L. Then the overall closed-system admits the following state-space representation:
The result below characterizes the static properties of the closed-loop system (40).
Proposition 4. The point (ζ, y, p) is an equilibrium of (40) if and only if y = 0,
and ζ satisfies
Proof. Suppose that (ζ, y, p) is an equilibrium of (40). Then,
By the first equality, we have y = 1y * for some y * ∈ R. Substituting this into (43c), and multiplying both sides of (43c) from the left by 1 , we obtain that y * = 0. Hence, (43c) results in p = 1q for some q ∈ R. The fact that q is given by (41), and that (42) holds, follow from suitable algebraic manipulations analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.
The converse result as well as uniqueness of the equilibrium also follow analogous to Lemma 3.
By (41), we have
where α * and β * are given by (17) . The equality above can be written as q = β * − α * 1 K(1q − b g ), which yields
Equivalently, we have K −1 K(1q − b g ) + b g = 1β * − α * 11 P g , and hence
By setting K = (α * I n + Q g ) −1 , the equality above returns P g = P g , with P g given by (24a). Then, by comparing (44) to (24c), we find that q = p . Finally,
where the second equality follows from (44), and the last one from (24b).
Remark 4. In case of linear dynamics, namely 2H ζ (ζ) = ζ R ζ W R ζ ζ, W > 0, the vector ζ is explicitly obtained as
Proposition 4 imposes the following assumption:
Assumption 3. There exists ζ ∈ R n−1 such that (42) is satisfied.
Remark 5. As evident from (37), the condition in Assumption 3 is a consequence of the agents' dynamics (30), rather than the choice of the controller. In case the graph G is a tree, the incidence matrix has full column rank and Assumption 3 is always satisfied with
where R + ζ is a right inverse of R ζ , and
The next theorem provides the main result of this section, which validates the proposed feedback algorithm.
Theorem 3. Let Assumption 3 hold. Then, the equilibrium (ζ, y, p) of (40) is asymptotically stable. Moreover, for K = (α * I n + Q g ) −1 , the vector (P g , P d , p), with P g defined as in (39b) and P d as in (38), asymptotically converges to the optimal Cournot-Nash solution (P g , P d , p ), the latter given by (29).
Proof. To prove asymptotic stability, we consider the Lyapunov function candidate
where H takes the form of the Bregman distance between ζ, ζ associated with the distance-generating function H(ζ) and the point ζ, namely [23] 
Since H is strictly convex, the Bregman distance H is nonnegative and is equal to zero whenever ζ = ζ. Then, clearly the function V has a strict minimum at (ζ, y, p). Computing the time derivative of V along the solutions of (40) yieldṡ
where we have used (43) together with the fact that
As V is positive definite, andV is nonpositive, we conclude that solutions of (40) are bounded. By invoking LaSalle's invariance principle, on the invariant set we have y = y, Lp = Lp. Noting that y = 0 and Lp = 0, we find that each point on the invariant set is an equilibrium of (40). By Proposition 4, the equilibrium is unique, and therefore the invariant set comprises only the equilibrium point (ζ, 0, p) given by (41) and (42). By continuity, the vectors P g and P d asymptotically converge to
, by Proposition 4 we have (P g , P d , p) = (P g , P d , p ). This completes the proof.
Remark 6. By Theorem 3, the controller (39) with k i = (α * +Q gi ) −1 , steers the network to the Cournot-Nash optimal solution. Note that, with the exception of the parameter α * , the i-th controller uses only the local variables at node i together with the communicated variables p i − p j of the neighboring nodes in the communication graph. If the parameter α * is not precisely known, then k i is set to (α * i + Q gi ) −1 whereα * i is an approximation of α * at node i. This approximation will shift the equilibrium of the closed-loop system away from the one associated with the Cournot-Nash solution. However, by Theorem 3, asymptotic stability will not be jeopardized, local price variables will synchronize, and the vector (P g , P d , p) will converge to the point (P g , P d , p) given in Lemma 4. The investigation of how far the equilibrium is from the CournotNash equilibrium in the presence of uncertainty on α * is left for future research.
Remark 7. When α * is not precisely known, another possibility is to estimate the parameter in advance, as utility functions are not frequently changing. To this end, one can implement a distributed algorithm such aṡ
which requires local parameter Q di , communicated variables χ ij , and assumes that each controller is aware of the total number of participating agents, namely n. It is easy to see thatα asymptotically converges to α * = (1 Q −1
While it is difficult to provide analytical guarantees for the online use of this estimator in the controller (39), our numerical investigation in Section IV validates stability and performance of such a scheme. 
IV. CASE STUDY
We illustrate the proposed pricing mechanism on a specific example of a network with producers and consumers, namely a four area power network [6] , see [24] on how a four area network equivalent can be obtained for the IEEE New England 39-bus system or the South Eastern Australian 59-bus. The power network model we consider here is given by the socalled swing equation [22] , and is mathematically equivalent to the dynamics in (33), under the assumption that voltages are constant and the frequency dynamics is decoupled from the reactive power flow. In this case, ζ is the vector of phase angles measured with respect to the phase angle of a reference bus (area 4), y is the vector of frequency deviations from the nominal frequency (50/60Hz), and the diagonal matrices M and D collect the inertia and damping constants. The vectors P g and P d denote the vector of generation and demand as before. The numerical values of the system parameters are provided in Table I . The physical and communication graphs, namely G and G c , are depicted in Figure 1 , where the solid and dotted edges denote the transmission lines and communication links, respectively.
For each {i, j} ∈ E, the (locally convex) function H ij in (30) is given by −|B ij |V i V j cos(x i −x j ), where B ij < 0 is the susceptance of the line {i, j}, and V i and x i are the voltage magnitude and voltage phase angle at the ith area (bus). In (33), this yields the expression
where W = diag(w k ), with w k := B ij V i V j , k ∼ {i, j}, and sin(·) is interpreted elementwise.
We consider linear-quadratic cost and utility functions given by (12) , (13) , with the parameters provided in Table I . We consider the distributed controller in (39), and we set ρ ij = 1, for each {i, j} ∈ E c . The closed-loop system (40) is initially at steady-state. At time t = 5s, we modify the utility functions by increasing b d by 25 percent, which results in a step in the demand. The response of the closed-loop system to this change is shown in Figure 2 , where the values are in per unit with respect to a base power of 1000MVA. As can be seen in the figure, at steady-state the frequency is regulated to its nominal value, which indicates that the matching condition (4) is satisfied. The local prices converge to the same value which identifies the market clearing price p . As desired, the triple (P g , P d , p) converge to the Cournot-Nash optimal solution in the closed-loop dynamicṡ
where R c denotes the incidence matrix of the communication graph, and we have set κ ij = 1 for simplicity. The system is initially at steady-state. At time t = 5s, we modify as before the utility functions by increasing b d by 25 percent. At the same time, we decrease the elements of Q d by 20 percent, which modifies the actual value of α according to (17) . For a better comparison to the system without the estimator, the initial value of Q d is chosen such that its new value will be equal to the one provided in Table I . The response of the closed-loop system (47) is illustrated in Figure 3 . As can be seen from the figure, frequency is regulated to its nominal value and the triple (P g , P d , p) converge again to the one given by (46). This means that the controller (39) equipped with the estimator (45) is able to steer the network to the Cournot-Nash optimal solution. Note that compared to Figure 2 , the transient performance is only slightly degraded.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a distributed feedback algorithm that steers a dynamical network to a prescribed equilibrium corresponding to the so-called Cournot-Nash equilibrium. We characterized this equilibrium for linear-quadratic utility and cost functions, and specified the algebraic conditions under which the production and the demand are strictly positive for all agents. For a class of passive nonlinear second-order systems, where production and demands act as external inputs to the systems, we devised a control algorithm (pricing mechanism) that guarantees the convergence of the closed loop system to the optimal equilibrium point associated with the previously characterized Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Considering a different type of competition such as Bertrand and Stackelberg games, as well as a thorough comparison of the equilibrium points resulting from competitive games against those obtained from a social welfare problem are of interest for future research.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: From Corollary 1, it follows that the first two statements are equivalent, and they imply the third statement. It remains to show that 3)⇒2). Now, suppose that the third statement holds. From
, using again Corollary 1, we obtain that p ≤ b dj for all j ∈ J. The condition p = b d yields p < b d , which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2: 1)⇒2) Suppose that the first statement holds. Then, by Proposition 3, we have
This is equivalent to αP g + α11 P g + Q g P g = β1 − b g , and to P g = (α(I + 11 ) + Q g ) −1 (β1 − b g ). Hence, (21) is obtained. This also shows the uniqueness of the solution. Now, note that (α(I + 11 ) + Q g )P g = β1 − b g , which is equivalent to (αI + Q g )P g = 1(β − α1 P g ) − b g . Elementwise, this can be written as (α + Q gi )P gi = β − α1 P g − b gi . Since P gi > 0 for all i, we obtain that β − α1 P g > b g .
2)⇒3) Next, suppose that the second statement of the lemma holds. Then, using the same chain of equivalences as above, we obtain (48). Therefore, by Proposition 3, we must have that γ i (P −gi )>0 for all i ∈ I. Without loss of generality, assume that b g1 = b g . Suppose by contradiction that γ 1 (P −g1 ) ≤ 0. Then, we have P g1 = 0, and thus β − b g − α1 P g = 0. This contradicts the inequality in the second statement of the lemma, which completes this part of the proof.
3)⇒1) Now, let the third statement hold, and set P g := (α(I + 11 ) + Q g ) −1 (β1 − b g ),P g ∈ R n >0 .
Again, the vectorP g can be written in analogy to (48) asP gi = (2α+Q gi ) −1 (β −b gi −α1 P −gi ) for every component i ∈ I.
For every i ∈ I, sinceP gi > 0, then (2α + Q gi ) −1 (β − b gi − α1 P −gi ) > 0, which is equivalent to say that γ i (P −gi ) > 0. Hence, the vectorP g satisfies (20) , and is therefore a solution to (19) beloging to the interior of the positive orthant.
3)⇔4) To complete the proof of the lemma, it suffices to show that the last two statements of the lemma are equivalent, namelŷ
whereP g is given by (49). From (49), we have (α(I +11 )+ Q g )P g = β1 − b g , which is equivalent to (αI + Q g )P g = 1(β − α1 P g ) − b g . Element-wise, this can be written as (α + Q gi )P gi = β − α1 P g − b gi . Therefore,P gi > 0 if and only if β −α1 P g > b g . By replacingP g with (α(I +11 )+ Q g ) −1 (β1 − b g ), we see that the latter inequality is equivalent to (22) .
Proof of Lemma 3:
Suppose that (ζ, y) is an equilibrium of (33). Then, 0 = E y (50a)
Hence, we find that y = 1 nŷ for someŷ ∈ R, and
By multiplying both sides of the equality above from the left by 1 , we findŷ = y * , where the latter is given by (36). By replacing the expression of y * back to the equality (51), and noting that E has full column rank, the equality (37) is obtained.
Conversely, assume that a point (ζ, y) satisfies (36) and (37). Clearly, E y = 0. Moreover, note that
Hence, multiplying both sides of (37) from the left by E gives
By the definition of y in (36), the equality above can be written as (50b), and therefore (ζ, y) is an equilibrium of (33). For uniqueness of the equilibrium, it suffices to show that ∇H ζ (ζ) = ∇H ζ (ζ) for some ζ,ζ ∈ R n−1 =⇒ ζ =ζ.
The equality ∇H ζ (ζ) − ∇H ζ (ζ) = 0 is equivalent to R ζ ∇H(R ζ ζ) − R ζ ∇H(R ζζ ) = 0.
Multiplying both sides of the equality above from the left by (ζ −ζ) returns (R ζ ζ − R ζζ ) (∇H(R ζ ζ) − ∇H(R ζζ )) = 0. By strict convexity of H, we find that R ζ ζ = R ζζ . The fact that R ζ has full row rank yields ζ =ζ, which completes the proof.
